The American electoral system often forces foreign policy into a four-year reactionary loop. Every presidential cycle introduces a risk of wholesale policy reversals. For instance, the transition from the Obama administration to the Trump administration saw the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA. This sudden shift destroyed much of the groundwork laid during years of intensive negotiation. When diplomacy becomes a partisan tool, it loses its stability.
Iranian leadership views this volatility through a lens of deep mistrust. They see Washington as an unreliable partner that may abandon a deal as soon as a new party takes the White House. This perception discourages Tehran from offering the concessions necessary for a lasting settlement. Instead of building institutionalized agreements, negotiators often produce fragile, executive-led arrangements that lack domestic legislative support in the US.
Congressional oversight and partisan polarization further complicate matters. Hardline factions in Congress can use any diplomatic opening to launch political attacks against the sitting President. This domestic pressure often forces the Executive Branch to adopt more hawkish stances to avoid looking weak. Consequently, the US-Iran relationship frequently enters a cycle of brinkmanship followed by tentative de-escalation, making actual, permanent breakthroughs nearly impossible to maintain.
