Revising the Coalition Formation Process
A primary source of paralysis rests in the fluid nature of Israeli coalitions. Mandating a formal election or vote (e.g., a 'snap election' threshold) when a government fails to form a mandated majority might stabilize the political scene. Currently, 'constructive vote of no-confidence' mechanisms often lack enforcement, allowing a minority of parties to indefinitely hold the government hostage. Implementing a stricter adherence to the basic principles of the 1992 electoral law, particularly concerning voting for legislative function rather than just government stability, could help.
Establishing Functional Threshold Quorums
To ensure efficiency, the Knesset could implement a higher quorum requirement for passing budgetary or national security legislation. While this might occasionally slow down routine business, it substantially reduces the effectiveness of fringe parties attempting to derail critical state functions. Furthermore, establishing a defined procedural deadline for key legislative priorities—perhaps 180 days post-budget announcement—would force a hard resolution instead of allowing bills to linger in endless committee review.
Amending Legislative Voting Procedures
Perhaps the most potent alteration would involve reforming the procedural powers of the 'Ketzedet' (Knesset) President. Granting the President greater authority to rule on procedural motions related to government stability, rather than merely observing them, offers a mechanism to bypass gridlock. Finally, instituting fixed, non-negotiable working days and hours, excluding periods designated for political negotiation, would push the legislative process forward, regardless of daily political maneuvering.
